This paper shows that Tzeng and Tzeng's protocol has a drawback that the protocol can be easily crashed by an evil VLR attack.
Introduction
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of key-based cryptosystem algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric. The two cryptosystems lead to different research strategies, especially in mobile communication systems. Some symmetric cryptosystems in mobile communication systems [8, 9, 10] have been proposed for authenticating mobile users in GSM, IS-41, and DECT. Since symmetric cryptosystems were first used, the power consumption and computational cost of handsets have both been reduced in these systems. However, these systems only offer one-way authentication. On the other hand, as for asymmetric cryptosystems, some protocols [4, 11] have been proposed with quite some advantages including achieving two-way authentication as well as being equipped with the mechanism of detecting clone. However, the major disadvantage of these protocols is higher computational cost.
To combine both the advantages of symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems, some hybrid schemes [1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15] have also been proposed.
These schemes have succeeded in enhancing the security level and reducing the computational cost at the same time. However, there are still some shortcomings in their schemes. In Beller et. al.'s scheme [1] , in order to authenticate mobile users, they have decided to send secret information via the network, which is very dangerous because an evil network operator may clone the user. Similar problems have also occurred in Park's scheme [12] . In Carlsen [3] and Tatebayashi's [13] schemes, a trust center has been additionally added to the system to distribute a session key for mobile users. In Yi et. al.'s scheme [15] , they have proposed an efficient computation method with less storage requirement in the mobile device. This scheme is, however, insecure [6] .
Recently, Tzeng and Tzeng [14] have proposed a hybrid scheme of efficient authentication protocol for the third-generation mobile communication system. Their protocol has both enhanced the security and improved the performance of the second-generation mobile communication system. Their protocol can satisfy some security requirements as follows: key exchange, mutual authentication, location privacy, anonymity, avoidance of clone, perfect forward secrecy, minimized long-distance real-time signaling, and minimized bilateral pre-arrangements between service providers and network operators.
Furthermore, their protocol can verify mobile users for international roaming.
However, this Tzeng-Tzeng protocol has a drawback that the protocol can be easily crashed by an evil VLR (Visitor Location Register) attack. An evil VLR can impersonate MS (Mobile Station) to access services for the use in the repeated authentication protocol in the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol because he/she can obtain the Ticket and session key of MS for the use in another VLR.
The reason is that if an evil VLR knows another legal VLR is providing services to an MS, the evil VLR can intercept the transmitted messages and forward his/her forged messages to the MS. The MS would believe that he/she is communicating with a perfectly normal VLR because the VLR has a legal certificate issued by HLR (Home Location Register), and thus the MS would reply his/her messages (such as temporal secret key and session key). Once the evil VLR receives the MS's messages, he/she can replay it to another legal VLR and then impersonate the MS to communication with another legal VLR in the repeated authentication protocol in the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol. In this paper, we shall point out this shortcoming more clearly later. Then, we shall propose a slight modification of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol to improve the performance. Our protocol can not only enhance the security of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol but also improve their protocol's efficiency.
The content of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we shall review Tzeng-Tzeng protocol. In Section 3, we shall analyze Tzeng-Tzeng protocol to show its weakness. Then, our improved protocol will be introduced in Section 4 and analyzed in Section 5. Finally, we shall conclude this paper with Section 6.
Review of The Tzeng-Tzeng Protocol
Tzeng and Tzeng proposed an authentication protocol in the integration environments [14] . Technically, their protocol can be divided into two subprotocols: the certificate-based authentication protocol and the repeated authentication protocol. The certificate-based authentication protocol is responsible for the registration procedure, handover procedure, and the procedure for international roaming. The repeated authentication protocol is responsible for authorizing the requested services by the MS always staying at the same VLR. In this section, we only briefly review the certificate-based authentication protocol. In Table 1 , we list the abbreviations and notations used in their protocol. The statement {A → B : messages} denotes that the messages are transmitted from A to B.
The Certificate-based Authentication Protocol: 
The key of generating message authentication code of VLR K s A temporal secret key XOR operation
When each entity is to be authenticated by others in the mobile network, the certificate-based method is used. HLR issues the certificate Cert M S and Cert V LR to MSs and VLRs. MS stores Cert M S , KR M S , and Cert HLR in their memory or SIM cards, and VLR stores the Cert V LR , KR V LR , K V LR , and
Cert HLR in their memory. K V LR means the secret key of VLR. The protocol is described in the following steps:
To authenticate MS, VLR generates R 1 and then sends his/her Cert V LR and R 1 to MS. and stores it.
VLR can authenticate Cert M S using the public key of HLR. After verifying MS, VLR generates a T ID and a T icket to MS, where the T icket is a MAC (Message Authentication Code). The MAC is derived from
After receiving these messages, MS decrypts T icket and (R1 R 2 ) KR V LR using K s . MS can recover (R 1 R 2 ) using the public key of VLR and check whether it is correct. If it is, then the session key R 1 R 2 is computed. Finally, MS stores the T icket and session key for the use in the repeated authentication protocol [14] .
Cryptanalysis of The Tzeng-Tzeng Protocol
In this section, we shall show that the Tzeng-Tzeng authentication protocol 2. After receiving Cert V LR and R 1 from V LR , MS believes that he/she is communicating with a legitimate VLR when making a call. MS follows the usual procedure in the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol; he/she produces the 5. V LR can intercept these messages and decrypt them because he/she has the key K s . Finally, V LR has a T icket of MS and a session key R 1 R 2 of MS. Once having these messages, the attacker (V LR ) can pretend to be the MS to communicate with VLR in the Tzeng-Tzeng repeated authentication protocol until the T icket is out of date.
Our Improved Protocol
In our modified protocol, we can overcome the attack from an evil VLR. Since the T icket and session key of MS can be in no way obtained, an attacker cannot impersonate MS to communicate with VLR any longer in our modified Tzeng-Tzeng repeated authentication protocol.
As in the original Tzeng-Tzeng protocol, HLR is distributes a certificate and a private key to each entity. For example, MS has Cert M S , KR M S , and
Cert HLR , and VLR has Cert V LR , KR V LR , K V LR , and Cert HLR , where K V LR means the secret key of VLR. Here, we also use the same abbreviations and notations in Table 1 . The statement " A → B : messages" denotes that the messages are transmitted from A to B.
In our improved protocol, we propose some slight modification to the certificate-based authentication part of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol. The other parts of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol, such as the repeated authentication protocol and the authentication protocol for international roaming, stay the same as they are. The steps of our improved protocol are shown in Figure 2 and as follows:
Figure 2: Our Improved Protocol
To authenticate MS, VLR generates a temporal secret key K s and then sends his/her Cert V LR and (K s ) KU M S to MS.
M S → V LR
Upon receiving Cert V LR and (K s ) KU M S from VLR, MS verifies whether Cert V LR is a legitimate certificate using the public key of HLR. MS decrypts K s using his/her private key. MS then generates an R and stores K s , R, and Cert V LR in his/her memory or SIM card. MS sends R and
Ks to VLR. Upon receiving these messages, VLR decrypts Cert M S and (R K s ) KR M S using the key K s . VLR can obtain KU M S from Cert M S to decrypt R and K s . VLR then verifies whether K s is the same as the one previously sent and verifies whether R remains the same too. If and only if both are yeses, VLR computes the session key R K s and stores it.
Note that no one can forge R even if R is in plaintext. If an attacker wants to forge it, he/she has to know K s and KR M S to compute (Cert M S (R
In an asymmetric cryptosystem, the private key KR M S is only known to MS. Therefore, no one can forge R.
VLR can authenticate the Cert M S using the public key of HLR. After verifying the MS, VLR generates a T ID and a T icket for the MS, where
After receiving this message, MS decrypts T icket and (R K s ) KR V LR using K s . MS can recover (R K s ) using the public key of VLR and check whether it is correct. If it is, then VLR computes the session key R K s . Finally, MS stores the T icket and session key for later use in the repeated authentication protocol [14] .
Analysis
Our protocol is a slight modification of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol [14] . The security and efficiency of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol have already been discussed and demonstrated in [14] . In this session, we shall only discuss the difference between their protocol and ours.
Security Analysis:
Our protocol can overcome the attack from an evil VLR that the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol falls for. In the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol, an attacker can intercept and modify the messages between MS and VLR and then impersonate MS to fool VLR. However, this attack will surely be detected by our VLR. The reason for that is only MS and VLR know the temporal secret key K s . Since K s is not known to any others, an attacker cannot obtain T icket and (R K s ) of MS.
Therefore, there will be no way to fool VLR in the repeated authentication protocol.
Efficiency:
In Table 2 , we can see that our protocol is more efficient than the original Tzeng-Tzeng protocol. In our protocol, one unit of computation time is reduced because MS does not generate a K s . Therefore, the computation cost is low, and the power consumption of MS is of course reduced in our proto- and T (XOR) indicates the computation time the XOR operation spends.
We divide T (Asymmetric) into two processes, signing S and verifying V , which use private key and public key respectively. T (Asymmetric − S) and T (Asymmetric − V ) indicate respectively the computing time the asymmetric cryptosystem the spending on signing process and the computing time the verifying process takes. In general, the verifying process is mostly faster than the signing process in an asymmetric cryptosystem. That is to say, in terms of the computations in the asymmetric cryptosystem in VLR, our protocol is more efficient than the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol, and in terms of the computations in the computing asymmetric cryptosystem in MS, the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol is more efficient than of our protocol. Overall, Our protocol is more secure and efficient than that of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have pointed out that the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol is not strong enough against the attack from an evil VLR and thus is not a secure protocol. Therefore, we have proposed an improvement of the Tzeng-Tzeng protocol which is a slight modification. The proposed protocol does not only 
